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ABSTRACT 
 
Current research emphasises the importance of the successful commercialisation of 
technology in the development of small firms and the need to address unique contextual 
dimensions when examining the concept of commercialisation. Guided by product and 
venture development lifecycle models as well as a structuration perspective, this case 
study examines how an entrepreneurial venture called Infovalley Life Sciences develops 
and commercialises the firm's digital human autopsy system despite the fact that the firm 
operates within an underdeveloped innovation system context. In-depth interviews were 
conducted with key individuals involved in the innovation and venture development 
processes. Analysis indicates that the entrepreneur and his or her team co-evolve with 
their business contexts in creating a favourable nvironment for themselves. This process 
requires the entrepreneur to integrate his or her broad knowledge of technology 
applications and the market with his or her team's highly specialised knowledge in the 
core technology domain; this process results in a successful product launch. This leads to 
the creation of internal core capability, which supports the commercialisation of new 
products and thereby contributes to the firm's development and growth. This link between 
structuration and resource-based perspectives of entrepreneurship augments the 
conceptualisation of entrepreneurship, technological innovation and firm's development. 
 
Keywords: innovation, firm development, entrepreneurial venture, digital human autopsy 
system, entrepreneurship, case study methodology, medical informatics systems, 
Infovalley, Malaysia  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Technological innovation is defined in this study as the process of developing 
and commercialising a new concept into a useful technology-based product, 
service or system (Tornatzky, Eveland, & Fleischer, 1990, p. 9–25). Especially 
for small technology-based firms, technological innovation is a vital process in 
creating wealth and developing immature economies (Audretsch, 2002; Martin, 
1994, p. 287–303). When sold at a profit, the new products that come from such 
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innovations not only provide financial returns to the inventors and their partners, 
but may also help in creating jobs (Jones-Evans & Westhead, 1996). 
Furthermore, when these products have a high level of utility, they usually 
benefit society in general. This highlights the importance of successful product 
commercialisation in contributing to the growth of new firms; this growth in turn 
contributes to a society's overall well-being and economic development (Martin, 
1994, p. 287–303).  
 
While both the commercialisation of new products within the medical field and 
the growth of the firms that develop them are important for a society's well-being, 
there is a lack of research on these important trends within the context of an 
immature market, such as Malaysia. Small firms in Malaysia face problems 
related to the underdevelopment of business clusters and the venture capital 
industry (Khairul Akmaliah & Mohd Fuaad, 2007, p. 126–160), both of which 
are important elements in supporting technological innovation and firm growth 
(Porter, 1998; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993, p. 3–21). [A business cluster refers to 
a business context that is comprised of a highly interconnected network of 
people, key resources and essential support institutions and systems (Porter, 
1998)].  
 
This lack of research deprives entrepreneurs and managers operating in this 
context of theories that could be operationalised in order to commercialise their 
products and grow their firms. Thus, research is necessary to identify the most 
influential factors in the development and commercialisation of new systems and 
related growth in new technology-based firms. Such findings would help to refine 
existing assumptions about the relationships between these processes across 
various business contexts (Gartner, 1985; Zahra, 2007).  
 
Examining these linkages requires documenting both the processes of 
commercialisation and firm growth and their contexts. This requires an in-depth 
conceptual analysis using a process-oriented theoretical lens. Thus, process-
oriented concepts of innovation and venture development (Churchill & Lewis, 
1983; Greiner, 1998; Kroeger, 1974) combined with a structuration-based 
perspective of entrepreneurship (Ma & Tan, 2006; Sarason, Dean, & Dillard, 
2006; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000) are utilised as the conceptual framework for 
this study; the case study technique selected is its methodology (Yin, 1994,             
p. 1–17).  
 
The chosen case study involves Infovalley Life Sciences (http://www.infovalley 
.net.my), a company that has developed and commercialised a medical 
informatics system called the digital autopsy system. It is reputed to be the only 
company in the world that has conceptualised and developed a digital autopsy 
facility for use within non-military settings. The company's digital autopsy 
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system has the potential to replace the existing standard autopsy, which is a 
procedure conducted on a dead body, typically with the aim of collecting 
evidence on the cause of death. It is also used to train medical students and to 
identify diseases and the effects of medicine (Bigg, 2004; Becker, 2005).  
 
Medical informatics is a scientific discipline that deals with the acquisition, 
storage, and use of health or medical information (Stead, 1998; Hersch, n.d.). As 
implied by the term, a medical informatics system, like a digital autopsy system, 
is typically comprised of knowledge regarding medical science and/or its 
applications, information systems, and statistical methods (Frisse, Braude, 
Florance, & Fuller, 1995). In Malaysia, the demand for medical informatics 
software solutions began increasing in the mid-1990s, particularly after the 
government encouraged the development of IT-based companies and initiated 
more demand for IT-based medical solutions via its Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC)1 project. Since the majority of Malaysian hospitals are owned by the 
government, the government has significantly influenced the demand for 
medicine and biotechnology systems and solutions (Abu Bakar, 2001; Mohan & 
Raja Razali, 2004). As IT and biotechnology converge, opportunities are huge for 
achieving high levels of growth among businesses involved in the biotech 
industry (Mohamed Arif, 2005). Therefore, this study's research question is: 
 
How has Infovalley Life Sciences managed to develop the digital autopsy 
system and commercialise it within a business environment that is lucrative but 
still has an underdeveloped innovation support system?  
 
Conceptual Framework: Innovation and New Venture Development 
Lifecycle and Structuration  Perspective of Entrepreneurship 
 
In this study, the process-oriented concepts of innovation and the venture 
development lifecycle are combined with the structuration-based notion of 
entrepreneurship to provide a basis for a conceptual framework.  
 
The product/innovation lifecycle model 
 
The developing stages of a product can be broadly divided into four phases 
(Bright, 1969, p. 28). The first stage is the product conception and development 
stage. Within this phase, a firm recognises a business opportunity, refines this 
opportunity into a viable business idea, and obtains necessary resources, which 
can be financial-, human-, and/or knowledge-based (Champion & Carr, 2000); 
these resources are needed to ensure that the business idea can be successfully 
developed into a physical product. The second stage is the commercialisation 
stage, in which the firm uses its resources to develop the idea into a prototype, 
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tests it to ensure it is properly built, and, once this is completed, manufactures 
and markets the product to potential customers.  
 
The next stage is the growth stage. In this stage, the firm's aim is to increase the 
sales volume of its product and achieve profitability. However, during this point 
of business development, the firm has to properly manage its production, sales 
and distribution of its product to make these processes more efficient and 
effective. The final stage is adaptation. In this stage, the sales growth of the 
firm's product and its increased revenue attract business rivals. If no preventive 
measures are deployed to counter the competitive threats, sales of the product 
will decrease, and its production will eventually cease. While this product 
lifecycle process appears linear, some of the activities may occur simultaneously. 
Also, the time taken for each stage varies by industry and organisational context 
(Bright, 1969: 28; Tornatzky et al., 1990, p. 27–50).  
 
The new venture development lifecycle model 
 
The new venture development lifecycle process can be separated into several 
phases (Churchill & Lewis, 1983; Kroeger, 1974; Greiner, 1998; Timmons, 1994, 
p. 207–233; Sullivan, 2000). Researchers have suggested that in order for a 
venture (or firm) to progress from one phase to the next, an entrepreneur must 
apply specific skills so as to develop and/or acquire specific capabilities matched 
to the unique requirements of each phase. Moreover, in completing each phase, 
there are several mini-crises that must be overcome, and the progression from one 
phase to the next is marked by a large crisis; overcoming this crisis determines a 
firm's ability to move to next phase (Greiner, 1998).  
 
Churchill and Lewis's (1983) conceptualisation focuses on the business activities 
that are performed by a firm and the concerns of the firm in each of the phases. In 
the first phase, called the existence phase, a firm recognises a business 
opportunity, obtains the required resources to turn this opportunity into a physical 
product, and then manufactures and markets this product to potential buyers. The 
concern of the firm at this phase is to have a viable product and market. Next is 
the survival phase, in which the firm struggles to attract enough customers to 
provide revenue so as to allow it to sustain its operations, be able to manufacture 
more products, and pay off debts. During this phase, the concern of the firm is on 
its ability to transform itself from a losing operation to a profitable business. 
These two phases can also be referred to together as the start-up phase 
(Timmons, 1994, p. 207–233).  
 
The third phase is the success phase, in which the firm manages to turn its 
venture into a profitable business. The main concern that the firm has at this 
phase is whether to use its current cash to support future expansion of its 
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operations or to stabilise its business and retain current profits. In the following 
phase, the take-off phase, the firm expands its operations rapidly, enters new 
markets, introduces more products, and fights off new competitors. At this phase, 
the firm has two main concerns. First, it is concerned about whether its current 
organisational structure is adequate to support its expanding operations. The 
second concern is whether it has enough cash to continue to support its growing 
business activities. Timmons refer to these two phases together as the growth 
phase (1994, p. 207–233).  
 
The last phase of this venture development process is the resource maturity 
phase. In this phase, the firm has transformed itself into a full-fledged 
organisation with a clear hierarchical structure, properly defined functions and 
responsibilities for its staff, and well-coordinated business processes and 
activities. Its main concerns at this phase are to consolidate its profits from 
activities performed in the take-off phase and to retain its flexibility and 
entrepreneurial spirit even though it has turned itself into a large organisation. 
Timmons refers to these as the maturity and stability phases (1994, p. 207–233).  
 
Structuration perspective of entrepreneurship 
 
A structuration perspective suggests that the identification and development of 
business opportunities is idiosyncratic to each entrepreneur. His or her interaction 
with the context is usually the most influential factor in the successful creation 
and development of a new business (Sarason et al., 2006; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). From this perspective, an entrepreneur is seen as 
continually modifying his or her behaviour and/or his or her business 
environment in order to achieve his or her goals; in other words, the entrepreneur 
and the organisational context develop together. Therefore, one should not 
consider the entrepreneur who brings forth an innovation as separate from the 
business opportunities that he or she has recognised and exploited (Sarason             
et al., 2006; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). In fact, the process of recognising 
and exploiting new business opportunities occurs through the entrepreneur when 
he or she creates his or her own "opportunistic environment" (Ma & Tan, 2006). 
While many people may receive the same or similar exposure to information 
concerning new business opportunities, the majority remain unaware of them, 
and thus, only a few are able to recognise the presence of such opportunities 
(Shane & Venkataraman, 2000; Ma & Tan, 2006).  
 
Moreover, from the proportionately small group who do recognise such 
opportunities, still fewer have the cognitive ability and other required capabilities 
to exploit the opportunities to the point of creating a new venture and achieving a 
level of profitability sufficient to fully recover the costs involved (Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000). In addition, since an entrepreneur is usually supported by 
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his or her venture partners, the quality of an entrepreneurial team supersedes in 
importance any other types of strengths, including potential markets and 
technological leadership (Timmons, 1994, p. 3–37). Therefore, it is only logical 
that a structuration perspective further suggests that the development of a new 
venture, which is typically triggered by the recognition and development of a 
business opportunity, is an idiosyncratic phenomenon as well. That is, its 
trajectory is determined by the interactions of the entrepreneur and his or her 
team with their business context (Sarason et al., 2006).  
 
The above models and perspectives, when viewed as a whole, provide a useful 
framework for analysing the development and commercialisation of an 
innovation (such as the digital autopsy system) by an entrepreneurial venture 
(like Infovalley Life Sciences) and the subsequent development of this venture. 
This study examines the processes of innovation and new venture development 
with the aim of identifying: (a) the important activities performed in these 
processes, (b) the significant constructs that influence these processes, and (c) the 
potential linkages of these constructs with the processes of innovation and 
venture development. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study addresses a theoretical gap in the literature on innovation and firm 
development in business contexts characterised as underdeveloped. Thus, this 
study focuses on a "how"-type research question and the development of a 
conceptual framework (Halinen & Törnroos, 2005; Cavana, Delahaye, & 
Sekaran, 2001, p. 1–44). This, in turn, has led to the use of a process-oriented 
case study methodology to examine innovation and venture development 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994, p. 1–17; Pettigrew, 1997). It is similar in design to 
the method used by Coviello and Munro (1997). The conceptual framework has 
also guided the design of the study's interview protocol. As there were no 
comparable cases, this research was by necessity a single-case study.  
 
The primary method of data collection was in-depth interviews with key 
individuals involved in the company's innovation and development. They 
included the lead entrepreneur-founder of Infovalley, Mathavan A. Chandran 
(hereafter referred to as Mathavan), Anu Sheela, the company's vice president of 
human resources and administration, and the lead scientist of the digital autopsy 
project, Dr. Pramod G. Bagali. They were asked to describe the development, 
launch and growth of Infovalley Life Sciences (see the interview protocol in 
Appendix A). All interviews were conducted from June through December 2006, 
and they were followed up with e-mails, which were sent to clarify data collected 
during the interview. Information was also gathered from public sources, 
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including the New Straits Times Press (NSTP) e-media, the Edge Daily 
(www.theedgedaily.com.my), and the STAR Online (www.staronline.com.my).  
 
In analysing the data, Eisenhardt's process (1989) of building a new theory via 
the case study method was adopted. First, information surrounding the case was 
put into chronological order from the approximate date when the idea for the new 
system was first conceived to the date of the final interview in December 2006. 
This phase of case data analysis matches with the study's process-oriented 
conceptual framework, and this format is similar to the one employed by 
Coviello and Munro (1997). Second, the case data were analysed using the 
study's conceptual framework, and a processual model of innovation and venture 
developments was constructed as a result. The model focused on a medical 
informatics system that was developed within an underdeveloped business 
context. The variables that influenced these developments were also identified. 
The model and construct developments were iterative and involved comparing 
the study's findings with those in existing literature to help establish internal 
validity.  
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Part 1: The Infovalley Group of Companies: Company Formation and 
Initial Business Development (2000–2003) 
 
Mathavan, who is the founder and lead entrepreneur of the Infovalley Group of 
Companies, graduated in 1992 from the Universiti Pertanian Malaysia (UPM, 
later renamed to Universiti Putra Malaysia) with majors in Biochemistry and 
Chemistry. During his undergraduate studies, Mathavan's father died due to an 
illness, which led to financial hardship for his family and financial insecurity for 
him. Mathavan first worked at a company that produced inorganic chemicals, and 
then at a company that was involved in petrochemicals and chemicals. While 
working at the second company, he also attended the International Islamic 
University's MBA programme in Corporate Finance. Later, he became a business 
manager at a multinational company. 
 
While still employed, he was constantly searching for an opportunity to start his 
own business, and in mid-2000, he saw his chance. At that time, the Malaysian 
MSC project was expanding, and e-learning was selected as one of its flagship 
product categories. Moreover, the Malaysian government was helping to create 
demand for this application. Believing in the potential growth of the education 
and consulting markets, Mathavan left his post at the multinational company and 
formed an e-learning company with two other entrepreneurs. They set up an 
office in the UPM-MTDC Incubator in August 2000 and used their own money 
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as seed funding. Within the first six months of operation, the partners managed to 
make a profit. In 2001, however, after eight months of operation, Mathavan left 
the venture because of disagreements with his partners.  
 
Mathavan then did consulting work to support himself for a number of months. 
While doing this, he discovered that biotechnology was a growing industry 
worldwide and that he had a real opportunity to harvest the industry's potential. 
Being determined to build his own long-lasting business someday, he decided to 
focus on this area of business and started a new company called Infovalley in 
June 2003.  
 
He soon noticed that a long gestation time and a large capital investment were the 
two main challenges faced by those in this industry. To overcome the latter 
challenge, he formed Infovalley Business Management as a subsidiary of 
Infovalley. This subsidiary was his venture's management consulting arm, and he 
utilised revenues from it to finance the development of his biotech business. The 
money was specifically used to recruit scientists and technicians who were 
needed to support the company's development. The first product developed by 
this business was a bioinformatics software solution. 
 
In 2002, after Mathavan had single-handedly run the company for 12 months, 
Sheela (the current vice president of human resources and administration) joined 
him. Before she was hired, Mathavan had no office; he only had a laptop to help 
him manage his business. Mathavan explained how the first staff members were 
hired:  
 
Let's say now you need some consulting work and decide that my work is worth 
a fee of RM120,000. So now, if I hire one fellow with a salary of RM10,000 per 
month, with that money, I could pay him for 12 months. Then, upon getting 
another consulting contract, I bring in another person. So, for each consulting 
contract I got signed, I'll match that against a new recruited employee. Of course 
there is a risk, like the contract may be called off, but that is the risk in business. 
 
In financing his venture, Mathavan avoided debts and equity-based money from 
venture capitalists or rich individuals, also known as business angels, as he was 
not convinced of their long-term benefits. Mathavan started hiring part-time 
employees in April 2003, and a year later, he began hiring full-time staff. This 
coincided with the opening of the company's first office in Bangsar Baru, Kuala 
Lumpur, and marked a more organised effort of the company in managing its 
bioinformatics business.  
 
In August 2004, Mr. Mathavan formed a new company called Infovalley Life 
Sciences, a subsidiary that focused on developing bioinformatics software 
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solutions. It was established to fulfil a major requirement for an MSC Malaysia 
Status2 application, which dictated that his company specialise in one of the MSC 
technology fields. Having MSC Malaysia status would enable the company to 
obtain tax exemptions for a period of 10 years and to hire an unlimited number of 
foreign experts.  
 
Mathavan continued to utilise the money generated from his consulting work to 
fund the conceptualisation, production, and business development of Infovalley 
Life Science's bioinformatics solutions. Uncertainty about the venture's success 
in the early days forced the company to employ a unique hiring practice, as 
explained by Mathavan:  
 
All these early guys (the five staff members) are specialists, but they also have 
knowledge in multiple domains within their specialty—generalists within a 
specialized environment. But as the intensity in the specialized domains 
increased, we hired specialists for that specialized environment.  
 
All these earlier team members were hand-picked by Mathavan himself, who 
from the beginning only hired programmers from Bangalore, India. According to 
him, Bangalore's lower high-end programming cost helped to reduce the 
company's overall business cost further. Later, this team of human resources was 
managed under Infovalley's wholly-owned subsidiary in Bangalore, which was 
called Infovalley Biosystems (India) Pvt. Ltd. and was incorporated in April 
2005.  
 
In February 2004, Infovalley offered its first bioinformatics solutions for sale for 
about RM700,000 (approx. USD200,000) through its subsidiary, Infovalley Life 
Sciences. Customers were willing to pay 40% of the contract value in advance to 
fund the initial development work. Using that money, extra hands were recruited 
to begin the actual work. Financial slack from this and other sales that followed 
was injected back into the business development of Infovalley Life Sciences.  
 
In its initial stage, Infovalley Life Sciences only developed solutions for its 
customers. However, its scientists and bioinformaticians later began to help 
customers operate the software solution. Eventually, Infovalley became 
extensively involved in its customers' R&D initiatives, thereby extending its 
services into R&D and even initiating some joint biotech R&D projects with its 
customers. These indirectly expanded the subsidiary's R&D knowledge base in 
biotechnology. To manage these efforts, Infovalley formed another subsidiary in 
December 2003 called Generti Biosystems, and it was established in same year as 
the concept of a digital autopsy system was conceived.  
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Part 2: The Infovalley Group of Companies: A Growing 
Bioinformatics Business; Infovalley's Digital Autopsy System: 
Opportunity Recognition and Initial Exploitation (2003–2005) 
 
The development of the Digital Autopsy System at Infovalley began in early 
2003, when the British Museum needed a system that could scan a 1,000-year-old 
mummy without destroying it in the process. It knew of a digital autopsy system 
called Virtopsy that was being used at the University of Bern's Institute of 
Forensic Medicine, in Switzerland. The development of Virtopsy was initiated by 
two research teams—one from the University of Berne's Institute of Forensic 
Medicine in Switzerland and the other from Linkoping University in Sweden 
(Thali et al., 2003; Toh & Singh, 2006). Since its conception, the Virtopsy system 
had been utilised in Swedish and Swiss hospitals for research purposes only and 
not for standard autopsies.  
 
However, the British museum found that the Virtopsy system was unsuitable in 
meeting its needs. It contacted Silicon Graphics International (SGI), the 
computing system vendor for Bern University, to determine if an alternative 
option was available, and SGI head office contacted its Asia-Pacific group. This 
group approached its Australian unit, which in turn alerted Infovalley about 
possible involvement.  
 
According to Mathavan, SGI Australia was informed about Infovalley's high-
definition visualisation programme by Bob Bishop, the founder and chairman of 
SGI.3 Mathavan explained that while attending the MSC International Advisory 
Panel (IAP) Meeting in Putrajaya in 2003, he had a brief informal discussion with 
Bob Bishop, who was one of the 18 IAP members then appointed to directly 
advise the Malaysian Prime Minister. 
 
After that meeting, SGI Australia contacted Mathavan to inquire if Infovalley 
could develop a better high-definition visualisation system. His answer was 
affirmative, as Infovalley already had a system up and running, although it was 
still very much in its infancy. His small development team at that time was 
enthusiastic about the project. According to Mathavan, they "had nothing to lose" 
for being innovative as the fulfiled the assignment, as they were not shackled by 
existing procedures, shared beliefs, current rules or embedded culture. The earlier 
"generalist" nature of the team also contributed to the exploratory culture among 
team members. The team managed to create a programme solution prototype that 
satisfied SGI, prompting SGI to invite Infovalley to become its partner in the 
project.  
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Following the success of the "mummy" project, Bob Bishop advised Mathavan to 
"look deeper into the virtual autopsy solution". He was receptive to the 
suggestion, because his company had an expert who could provide advice on 
autopsy system development. This expert was Dr. Pramod Bagali, an Indian 
national who was at that time involved in a bioinformatics project; he was a 
forensic pathologist by training. He was one of the five pioneering scientists 
recruited by Mathavan; moreover, he was asked to lead the digital autopsy 
project. Work on the digital autopsy concept officially started in early 2004. 
Pramod, who was passionate about creating a more humane autopsy system and 
overcoming the many limitations associated with physical autopsies, did the 
initial work while he was still in India. He was a part-time scientist at Infovalley's 
Bangalore office before working full-time, a decision he made, because he 
prefers the exploratory culture within the company and believes in its future.  
 
The doctor had conducted more than 9,000 autopsies as a forensic pathologist in 
the Indian army. Drawing from his long working experience and his passion for 
developing a more humane method of autopsy, he designed the original blueprint 
for the project and outlined the initial functional requirements for the system. 
Eventually the development team for the digital autopsy system solution was 
comprised of 20 experts from Malaysia and India, including bioinformaticians, 
medical doctors, forensic pathologists, systems engineers, and programmers. The 
Indian team operated under Infovalley's wholly-owned subsidiary in Bangalore 
called Infovalley Biosystems (India) Pvt. Ltd., which was incorporated in April 
2005.  
 
The Indian team was brought into the autopsy project, because they had a great 
depth of knowledge in the development of vital system algorithms. Hiring these 
experts was also done at a lower cost compared to Malaysian employees. 
Moreover, having them would enable Infovalley to collaborate with more 
international partners located in India, thereby enhancing the chances to achieve 
its goals of entering the US and European markets. However, programme 
compilation, software integration, and system testing were all performed in 
Malaysia, because by those stages of system development, Pramod, the team's 
head, had been transferred to Malaysia.  
 
In March 2005, the management of the digital autopsy system was assigned to 
iGene, a newly-formed Malaysian subsidiary of Infovalley. This was to ensure 
that scientists and technologists in that subsidiary focused their efforts solely on 
developing the digital autopsy system. Nevertheless, in order to capitalise on 
Infovalley's well-established reputation, its name would be used when marketing 
the Digital Autopsy System. 
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In June 2005, approximately a year after the system was conceived, it was ready 
for demonstration. During the Inaugural Biotech IAP meeting in Los Angeles, the 
system was shown to the Malaysia's Prime Minister and his delegation, which 
included the Minister of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
(MOSTI). The Prime Minister was receptive to the concept and suggested that 
the technology be further developed, with the idea of ultimately establishing it as 
the new standard autopsy procedure in Malaysia – a nation in which the previous 
autopsy standard was opposed by its majority Muslim population. In fact, in 
1984, Malaysia's Majlis Fatwa Malaysia (National Fatwa Council)4 had decreed 
that autopsy should only be conducted on bodies of Muslims in unavoidable 
circumstances, such as when it was required by court order; see the official 
website of the Malaysia's National Fatwa Council at http://www.e-fatwa.gov.my.  
 
The Prime Minister then invited Infovalley to provide another presentation to 
other Malaysian government officials at the Multimedia Development 
Corporation's (MDeC) Virtual Reality Centre in Cyberjaya in October 2005. 
MOSTI later requested that Infovalley present the digital autopsy system concept 
in detail and also suggested that briefings be made to the Ministry of Health, as 
that ministry would be the final end-user of the system. Following these 
presentations, the Ministry of Health in turn recommended that Infovalley 
conduct several meetings with other relevant governmental and non-
governmental organisations to seek their feedback. These included the Royal 
Malaysian Police Department, the Attorney General, the Islamic Development 
Authority (under the Prime Minister's Office), the National Fatwa Council, and 
the Malaysian Legal Council.  
 
Part 3: Infovalley's Digital Autopsy System Commercialisation: Gaining 
Acceptance for the System and Organising the Pilot Digital Autopsy Facility 
(2006 and Beyond) 
 
Having proven the market feasibility of the autopsy system, Mathavan and his 
team began to rally support for the system among the system stakeholders. 
Autopsy had long been performed according to stringent, established procedures 
to which the digital autopsy system had to comply. To ensure it would be 
authorised for use in Malaysia, Infovalley had to make sure its system complied 
with policies and procedural requirements of a number of official scientific 
bodies of oversight, which included:  
 
1. the International Forensic Medical Examination,  
2. the National Institute of Forensic Medicine (NIFM), which is the 
governing body of Malaysian forensic pathology,  
3. the standard British Commonwealth practices,  
4. the Criminal Procedure Codes (CPCs),  
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5. the Global Technical Working Group, and  
6. the Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) 
standards.  
 
Endorsements were also sought from various departments and agencies in the 
Malaysian Ministry of Health, which would supervise the use of the digital 
autopsy system in its implementation in government hospitals. Discussions were 
also conducted with and presentations were made to the Royal Malaysian Police 
Department, which gave input regarding how the system's data capturing and 
storage processes would be beneficial to law enforcement work. Infovalley also 
held discussions with the Attorney General's office to obtain approval on the 
standard operating procedures (SOP) for the system's use. This was also to ensure 
that the system could be seamlessly integrated into the Malaysian judicial system, 
especially when it was used for court cases involving forensic medicine (Toh & 
Singh, 2006). As a result, it received the requested support from the Attorney 
General's Office.  
 
Approval was also obtained from the Department of Islamic Development of 
Malaysia (JAKIM) and the National Fatwa Council of Malaysia. After gaining a 
better understanding of its features and functions, the two departments were keen 
on endorsing the use of the Digital Autopsy System in Malaysia, as it would 
solve some of the problems that had caused Islamic leaders to discourage 
autopsies on the bodies of deceased Muslims. According to Mathavan, by 
December 2005, both JAKIM and the National Fatwa Council had begun to 
further study the digital autopsy system to formulate a religious decree 
addressing the use of digital autopsy on deceased Malaysian Muslims. They 
formulated a preliminary decree stating that should the initial findings from the 
digital autopsy be found inconclusive, then a standard autopsy could be 
recommended as the next course of action. Given Malaysia's large Muslim 
population and the fact that Islam is the country's official religion, this was a 
huge boost for gaining acceptance of the digital autopsy system by authorities in 
Malaysian hospitals and by those responsible for setting forensic standards in the 
country.  
 
While the company was seeking approval from relevant authorities, the digital 
autopsy system was continually tested. Finalising the system completion involved 
setting up a Digital Autopsy Test Facility at the Hospital Universiti Kebangsaan 
Malaysia (HUKM) and consulting experts from the Forensic Units of HUKM and 
Hospital Kuala Lumpur (HKL) for their advice on facility set-up. 
 
In December 2005, Infovalley received authorisation from the Prime Minister's 
Office and MOSTI to build a pilot digital autopsy facility in one of the 
government hospitals; it would be fully financed by MOSTI. A budget of            
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RM10 million (approximately USD3 million) was allocated to Infovalley for the 
installation of the facility, which was to be equipped with the first digital autopsy 
system designed for common usage in the world. While the facility would be 
owned by MOSTI, it would be implemented and managed by the Ministry of 
Health. Mathavan summarised the process of developing and commercialising 
the digital autopsy system:  
 
Once the business side established the utility of the system, then the business 
team described about the market to the science team (medical team), who in turn 
developed the conceptualisation further. Then, the technology team came in. 
The business team visited the customers again, and discussed with them about 
the concept, and based on the input, the business team continued to 
communicate with the science and technology teams. So, the cycle was 
business-science-technology, which occurred iteratively. When needed, the 
technologists and scientists also met with the customers to explain technical 
matters, and to build up our case. 
 
As its autopsy system was now going to be an entire facility, Infovalley was 
required not only to put together an information systems (that is, the hardware 
and software) but also to integrate all the necessary parts, including the 
construction of the building and the setting up of necessary furniture and systems 
within it. The planned facility had two major components: (1) the physical 
facility, which was an area of about 2,500 sq feet planned to be located next to 
the hospital mortuary, and (2) Infovalley's Internet-based Digital Autopsy 
System, which was to be operated using its in-house design software (called 
INFOPSY V1.2) and supported by necessary hardware, including medical 
imaging and visualisation input/output devices (processors, network systems, and 
a computer display) from General Electric (GE) and SGI machines. 
 
According to Mathavan, once implemented, the user-friendly navigational tools 
would enable forensic pathologists to conduct autopsy with ease. They would 
only need to check results; and if they were not satisfied with the results of the 
digital autopsy for any part of the body, they could then proceed with a standard 
autopsy on the specific parts without the need to physically cut open other parts 
of the body. While the Digital Autopsy System was originally intended to 
complement the standard traditional autopsy, both its developers and users were 
well aware that it had the potential to become the dominant method of autopsy 
over time.  
 
The company had to prepare SOP for the hospital based on the requirements of 
the National Institute of Forensic Medicine and the Royal Malaysian Police 
regarding how to handle dead bodies. It also was required to provide domain 
training in the medical applications of the system (e.g., how to interpret visual 
results) and systems training (e.g., how to reboot the system) to the health 
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professionals at that hospital. Infovalley planned to have its own forensic 
pathologists (two Indian nationals and one Australian) conduct the former type of 
training and its systems engineers conduct the latter type of training. As part of 
its nationwide roll-out, the company intended to install the unit at all six regional 
forensic centres in Malaysia.  
 
With the finalisation of INFOPSY™ V1.2, the company's forensic medicine 
application software design, by the end of September 2006, the company had 
completed the development of its first-generation digital autopsy system. When 
combined with crime scene and/or related situational images, the system would 
enable pathologists and other relevant authorities to construct an entire image 
necessary to make decisions related to autopsy results.  
 
Also by the end of September 2006, Infovalley had appointed a corporate 
financing house to raise RM20 million (approximately USD5 million) in funds 
for iGene, its subsidiary that manages the Digital Autopsy System. About 70% of 
the fund was set aside for business development, and the rest was intended for 
R&D activities. This fund was deemed necessary in order to support the 
aggressive global expansion that was part of iGene's long-term strategic planning. 
Among other things, the plan called for the establishment of offices in five 
different countries. Nevertheless, by the end of September 2006, neither the pilot 
nor the test-facility had yet been implemented, since the company was still 
waiting for authorisation from the respective ministries to proceed.  
 
At the same time, the company also managed to secure a grant from MOSTI to 
develop and initiate clinical validation of its molecular diagnostic kit, which 
originated from its earlier biotechnology R&D. Its contractual bioinformatics 
software solution business had continued to grow over the years and successfully 
entered the US market in August 2005. Being profitable from the start and adding 
additional products, the company continued to register more revenues. Moreover, 
Infovalley Business Management, the subsidiary consulting arm, was still in 
operation. 
 
The company retained all its pioneer staff that it had recruited in its early days. 
The senior scientists had been given stock options as retention incentives, while 
the company's human resources plan was to hire more business-oriented people. 
The company had approximately 45 staff members, and 12 of them were PhD  
holders. There were 22 staff members in Malaysia and 23 employees in 
Bangalore, India. For the Malaysian office, the company was planning to hire up 
to 58 employees by June 2007 and add another 30 by December the same year, 
while for the Bangalore office, it intended to have another 10 by December 2007. 
The number of employees holding PhDs was expected to increase to 20 by the 
end of 2007.  
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Up to September 2006, Mathavan owned 90% of Infovalley and Sheela retained 
the remaining 10%. Infovalley Life Sciences was once 100%-owned by 
Mathavan, however by early 2006, Mathavan had given up 35% of his shares in 
the other two subsidiaries to individual investors in return for capital for business 
expansion.  
 
According to him, he had no current plan to publicly list Infovalley as a way to 
gain more capital to support its aggressive growth plans. There were several 
reasons for this. First, he believed that the bioinformatics and biotechnology 
capital market was not yet fully developed in Malaysia. Before a reasonable level 
of market acceptance can be achieved, the targeted customers and the larger 
business community must be convinced of the system's usefulness and capacity 
for value creation. Second, even if the market accepts the technology, given the 
demanding capital utilisation in the medical and bioinformatics businesses, the 
amount of money raised through public listing could be easily used up within a 
short period of time. Therefore, the company decided to create a larger market 
first with regard to the Digital Autopsy System in Malaysia and, later, in other 
foreign countries. Logically, the local market for the system seemed to hold huge 
potential. When it becomes common practice to use the system in hospitals 
around the world, the market for the system is bound to grow very quickly.   
 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
The recognition of a new business opportunity in the field of bioinformatics was 
the impetus for starting the Infovalley venture. The startup phase of the company 
began with the development of bioinformatics solutions (Product No. 1) for 
contractual customers. Having know-how in bioinformatics solutions and being 
able to use contractual revenues to recruit experts as well as finance other 
expenses allowed the company to engage in other exploratory works. The first of 
these was the development of a molecular chip used to detect genetic diseases 
(Product No. 2). Moreover, by leveraging its strengths in high-intensity 
computing and high-definition visualisation as part of its development of 
bioinformatics solutions, the company was able to enter into a new market of 
medical informatics, creating the Digital Autopsy System (Product No. 3). This 
system, which is the first full-fledged digital autopsy system in the world, is 
designed for common usage and has the potential to make a substantial change in 
the world by replacing standard autopsy methods and by making possible a wide 
range of applications with regard to both autopsy procedures and the Digital 
Autopsy System itself.  
 
Specifically in the case of the Digital Autopsy System, we can identify five 
critical milestones in its initiation, development and commercialisation (see 
94 
Technological innovation and firm development 
 
Appendix B). At each of these milestones, interactions occurred between the 
company's internal managerial context and its external business environment.  
 
The First Milestone 
 
The Digital Autopsy System innovation (Product No. 3) started when the lead 
entrepreneur initiated a connection with the founder and chairman of SGI. This 
connection led SGI to offer a "mummy assignment" to the company. By handling 
this assignment, the company developed a much-improved visualisation 
technology as a solution. This first milestone, proving the utility of the 
technology, involved establishing the usefulness of the core imaging and 
visualisation technology to the medical informatics field. This milestone was 
undoubtedly reached because of the lead entrepreneur's persistence in finding 
new business opportunities. He was driven by his past working experience, plus 
his acquired knowledge and skill. There was also a synergistic effect between his 
strengths and those of his development team. The entire team's readiness to 
capitalise on their existing strengths in high-intensity computing and high-
definition visualisation (an internal factor) by taking up the mummy assignment 
(an external "trigger") was key to their success.  
 
The Second Milestone 
 
The recognition of a business opportunity and matching the technology utility 
with its commercialised application, can be considered the second milestone 
reached by the business. It was also achieved through the lead entrepreneur's 
connection with the SGI founder and chairman. Thus, the creation of connections 
led to confirmation of the core technology value and helped open the window to a 
new business opportunity. These two major milestones demonstrate how the lead 
entrepreneur continually "modified" his environment in two important ways. 
First, accumulated the needed capital via his consulting work as well as recruited 
key scientists by utilising funds obtained through this work. Second, he 
communicated with external experts, which provided with him an exclusive 
window for new business opportunities (Sarason et al., 2006; Shane & 
Venkataraman, 2000).  
 
In fact, one direct communication with an expert happened over the course of a 
meeting. As such, this was a distinct event that played a key role leading to the 
recognition of a business opportunity. The event itself happened partly because of 
the availability of a government-based platform (the IAP), which enabled the lead 
entrepreneur to interact with an expert and to directly access new business ideas 
from him. It highlights the importance of IAP to Malaysian entrepreneurs; in this 
case, the IAP appointee helped  Mathavan build a critical "intellectual networks" 
and exposed him to a new business opportunity. Socialisation with an expert thus 
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can enable a more seamless transfer of new concepts and of new information 
about potential markets, thus affirming and extending Locke's (1999) views about 
the importance of "focused" interactions in achieving business success. This 
study, which shows an expert as the main source of information for a new 
business opportunity, thus extends the findings of Ozgen and Baron (2007); they 
argue that social networks are a significant source of information for new product 
ideas. The focused interactions studied here were guided by Mathavan's 
aspirations to build a large, successful company. This affirms Locke's emphasis 
on the importance of "strategised" networks as well as Watson, Hogarth-Scott, 
and Wilson's (1998) findings that an entrepreneur's growth orientations 
determines the outcome of his or her firm.  
 
The Third Milestone 
 
Equally important is the availability of one or more leading internal experts. 
Pramod, the forensic pathologist whose core domain of expertise and passion is 
autopsy, served as exactly such an expert for Infovalley. After agreeing to join 
the project, he brought a passion to develop a more humane autopsy system, and 
his vast experience in the field significantly influenced the events as they 
unfolded. Thus, his joining can be considered the third milestone for the business. 
He designed the system blueprint and determined its functional requirements, 
which served as important precursors to the system's actual development.  
 
Also significant in the initial stages of development was the company's own 
entrepreneurial spirit, which encouraged creativity by allowing its members to 
explore new territory and accept new challenges. This was achieved partly 
through Mathavan's unique hiring strategy that involved recruiting "generalist-
specialists" as well as through his ability to spot talented scientists and 
technologists for recruitment. These were thus important factors in creating a 
team of creative people and an environment in which they could do their best 
work.  
 
Additionally, at the time as the Digital Autopsy System was developed, the 
company had already collected revenues from its other businesses. It had also 
established infrastructure for managing new product development and 
maintaining key partnerships; this infrastructure developed as a result of its 
bioinformatics business activities. Overall, this infrastructure characterised the 
company's "internal core capability," which provided support for the 
development of the Digital Autopsy System. 
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The Fourth Milestone 
 
The demonstration of the Digital Autopsy System's technological usefulness to 
Malaysian government officials was a fourth milestone. This was made possible 
because SGI's CEO, in his capacity as one of the IAP members, acted as a 
"matchmaker" between Infovalley and the Malaysian government. This 
highlights the importance of an advisory body like IAP as a supportive marketing 
channel for increasing an innovation's visibility among targeted potential 
customer groups.  
 
The Fifth Milestone 
 
After these four milestones, there were continual efforts by the entrepreneurial 
team to exploit this new business opportunity and to build up a case of the 
commercial viability of the Digital Autopsy System. This involved adapting 
internal research behaviour and technology to match market needs. The 
adaptations included: (1) rapid exchanges in information between the company's 
business side and major technology decision-makers (government ministries, the 
main autopsy procedural authorities, and religious authorities) and (2) effective 
internal communications among members of the respective departments of the 
business, including the business (or marketing) side, the scientific (or medical) 
side, and the technological (IT) side. This was an iterative process that involved 
continually repeating the same or similar activities and approaches. This process 
was designed to exploit the business opportunity in every way possible, with the 
goal of eventually commercialising the Digital Autopsy System.  
 
The team's efforts finally paid off when they received the necessary approval 
from various government ministry offices to implement a digital autopsy pilot 
facility in a government hospital in Malaysia. Making this first sale for                 
RM10 million, which provided the testing environment for the system and 
sponsors for its commercialisation, and receiving indications of further possible 
commitment from the government for the installation of more systems in the 
future constitute the fifth milestone. Reaching this milestone was critical in 
ensuring the marketability of the system. The system's acceptance clearly was 
facilitated by the fact that it met the Malaysian Muslim population's religious 
needs, received endorsements from key decision-makers in Malaysian religious 
groups, and had complied with all medical and scientific autopsy standards and 
requirements.  
 
By September 2006, the pilot digital autopsy facility was not yet installed; 
therefore, information on its implementation is not available. Nevertheless, a 
number of issues related to the Digital Autopsy System's implementation must be 
addressed, including whether the company will be able to manoeuvre around the 
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bureaucratic "red tape" of government ministries. This is especially pertinent, as 
the pilot system and facility are owned by MOSTI, but the hospitals are under the 
supervision of another ministry, the Ministry of Health. The system and facility 
must adapt to various different organisational structures and procedures imposed 
by the Ministry of Health and by the various hospitals. At the hospital level, the 
system implementation must be carefully planned and executed, as the facility 
could easily be labelled by some as a radical hospital innovation. The facility is 
entirely new to its adopting hospitals as well as to its end-users, the medical 
examiners and forensic pathologists. There are several concerns regarding its 
implementation. First, the system may require rigorous and time-consuming 
testing to ensure the reliability of the data retrieved and thus valid autopsy results. 
Second, the medical examiners and forensic pathologists may require some 
undetermined amount of time to become familiar with and have confidence in the 
facility's reliability and usage.  
 
The decision to implement involves several levels of the Ministry of Health, 
hospitals and end-users; it thus adds to a complex process of innovation 
implementation. Addressing any implementation issues is critical, because the 
ultimate aim of the innovation process is to fully implement the new digital 
system, with all features and functions utilised by end-users (DePietro, Wiarda, & 
Fleischer, 1990, p. 151–175; Fleischer & Roitman, 1990, p. 197–232; Chiasson  
et al., 2007). Additionally, a successful, fully implemented pilot would likely 
influence the fate of future system implementations and thereby would also 
influence the profitability and sustainability of Infovalley. 
 
While developing the Digital Autopsy System, Infovalley also completed the 
development of its other exploratory work, the molecular chip project. It also 
continued to accept more contractual projects from various government and 
private agencies for bioinformatics solutions, both locally and abroad. Both the 
contractual and successfully-developed exploratory projects increased the 
company's revenues and allowed it to proceed to the growth phase. As the Digital 
Autopsy System has a large potential market, a fully launched system is expected 
to accelerate the growth and increase the value of the Infovalley venture and its 
group of companies. As developing and implementing medical and health care 
solutions naturally extends to servicing the customers, the services component of 
the Infovalley business is also expected to experience high growth. With these 
developments and other new injections of capital, the company is geared toward 
moving to the maturity stage and reaching stability.  
 
Another finding worth noting is the differences found in opportunity recognition 
processes among the three major businesses of Infovalley. In the first business 
(Product No. 1), identifying client needs and then determining the capabilities 
and technologies necessary to serve them characterised the way Infovalley's 
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bioinformatics solutions business developed. This indicates a purposeful 
opportunity recognition process (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003). In contrast 
to the first business, frequent interactions with clients in the second business 
(Product No. 2) enabled the company to recognise opportunities in biotechnology 
R&D, which led it to develop the molecular diagnostic kit. This could be 
classified as an unintentional opportunity recognition process, as the venture was 
not purposefully looking for a new opportunity but rather discovered it 
accidentally. In the third business (Product No. 3) involving the Digital Autopsy 
System, the developmental process was a hybrid one, as it was both a purposeful 
and unintentional discovery. It was purposeful insofar as the lead entrepreneur 
introduced himself to the SGI chair. Yet, it was unintentional, since while 
Mathavan was trying to prove the utility of the core technology, he realised the 
existence of the third business opportunity through a discussion with an expert on 
that issue. With each subsequent product (Products No. 1–3), the company 
continuously enhanced its ability to identify, develop, and exploit new 
opportunities to meet market needs. The high-growth orientation of the founder 
toward his firm appeared to be a significant factor in triggering the movement 
from one phase to the next. This finding shows that the entrepreneur's aspiration 
for his or her company not only determines the outcome of the venture 
development, but it also helps trigger movement to the next phase. This is similar 
to Churchill and Lewis's (1983) and Watson et al.'s (1998) propositions. 
 
The findings also indicate that the life experiences of the lead entrepreneur had 
direct and indirect effects on the venture's developmental growth path (Cope, 
2005). These experiences include: Mathavan's past financial insecurity, his 
previous experience in starting, managing, and facing the failure of his first 
venture, and his experience in successfully developing and selling bioinformatics 
solutions (the first business of Infovalley). His past financial insecurity motivated 
him to continually seek opportunities and influenced him to be a successful 
manager in his early corporate life and a persistent entrepreneur later on. 
Nevertheless, with no previous experience in starting an entrepreneurial firm and 
a lack of reference points or role models around him, Mathavan was forced to 
develop business acumen on his own and rapidly acquired the necessary skills 
and knowledge.  
 
The conflict between Mathavan and his partners in the previous e-learning 
venture, which influenced him to adopt a more cautious ownership management 
strategy for Infovalley, demonstrates how past experience helps shape an 
entrepreneur's current behaviour (Cope, 2005). 
 
His "cautiousness" may have led to a more meticulous information-gathering 
process in assessing new markets and associated risks, thus improving the 
possibility of the venture's success. The previous experience may have also 
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influenced him to be more aware of the importance of team cohesiveness in 
running his business. This could have influenced him to develop more effective 
recruitment processes and business strategies. However, it also shows that an 
entrepreneur may become more risk averse in certain contexts; as such, he could 
become an impediment to the company's growth.  
 
Moreover, in developing business concepts and products, Infovalley's founder 
and his team not only capitalised on existing networks but also formed new 
networks with university professors, scientists and researchers in several public 
research centres. The existing underdeveloped innovation system did not seem to 
have a significant effect on Infovalley. For example, acquiring funding was not a 
major problem for Mathavan. It was his personal decision not to seek or use 
outside money for his business in its seeding phase; rather, he utilised his profits 
from consulting to fund the biotech business. Revenues from the business 
consulting were also supplemented by contractual projects, for which revenues 
were assured and received with less delay in comparison to exploratory projects. 
The revenues were used to fund the exploratory works, which in turn supported 
the expansion of the company's business portfolio. In addition, having MSC 
status enabled the company to secure government grants and tax breaks that 
helped reduce their capital burden while developing new products. Having this 
status also enabled the company to hire an unlimited number of foreigners who 
have the required expertise at cheaper costs. Perhaps Mathavan used this as a 
deliberate strategy, simply because he knew how difficult it was to get seed 
funding in Malaysia.  
 
Moreover, not being in a clustered environment did not appear to cause a major 
problem for Mathavan's venture. First, he was able to overcome the lack of 
opportunities to socialise with experts, which is usually associated with an 
underdeveloped innovation support system. This was accomplished by 
connecting with an expert that offered him insights on a new business 
opportunity. Second, when the Digital Autopsy System was first initiated, 
Mathavan's company already had an infrastructure to manage new product 
development as well as the needed partnerships to support the company's 
software and hardware integration. Therefore, the benefit of being in a clustered 
environment in term of close support from hardware and software vendors was 
irrelevant for his company. All of this supports the idea that entrepreneurial team 
capability is the major determinant of successful product commercialisation and 
new company development (Kroeger, 1974; Timmons, 1994, pp. 3–37, 207–
233).  
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ON SYSTEM 
COMMERCIALISATION AND FIRM DEVELOPMENT  
 
The venture team members' ability to create an environment for themselves in 
which opportunities were quickly recognised and fully exploited and their ability 
to act within the limit of that environment are two important variables that 
influenced the success of the Digital Autopsy System's development and 
commercialisation. These two abilities were guided by the founder's aim toward 
achieving high-growth for his company and sustained by him and his team 
through their need to succeed. On the other hand, having successfully developed 
a product family that comprised of an expanded portfolio of contractual and 
exploratory projects that was built on each product's strengths appeared to be the 
critical factors for the firm's successful development as a business.  
 
Taken together, these core characteristics helped Infovalley Life Sciences 
overcome the problems of innovation system immaturity in which it operated in. 
This finding is consistent with a structuration perspective of entrepreneurship, 
which proposes that both the entrepreneur and the firm co-evolve with their 
business contexts (Sarason et al., 2006). The founder's past experience, 
aspirations for his or her company, and breadth of knowledge as well as his or her 
team's depth of knowledge (Alvarez & Barney, 2002, p. 89–105; Kirzner, 1973; 
Newbert, Gopalakrishnan, & Kirchhoff, 2008), emerge as important constructs in 
the co-evolution process.  
 
Moreover, the concept of entrepreneurial actions at the individual (entrepreneur) 
and firm (venture-team) levels, which is developed based on the resource-based 
perspective of entrepreneurship (Alvarez & Barney, 2002, p. 89–105), is useful in 
explaining the recurring actions of the entrepreneur and his team (entrepreneurial 
actions) and their co-evolution with their environment. These developmental and 
adaptive actions reflect the team's capabilities in commercialising the system and 
growing the firm.  
 
These entrepreneurial actions, in turn, can be distinguished into two types. The 
first group is a set of variables that influence the success of product 
commercialisation, while the second group of factors has an effect on the success 
of the company's development as a business. The first set of actions involves 
continuous iterations of individual, entrepreneurial actions and firm-level, 
venture-team actions. All three of the firm's businesses involved the lead 
entrepreneur and his venture team continually creating an "opportunistic 
environment."  
 
The continuous high alertness toward new business opportunities and the 
integration of the entrepreneur's knowledge breadth about the market and 
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technology applications with his team's knowledge depth in the core technology 
domain began with the company's first product development. In this process, the 
entrepreneur was highly attentive and had high entrepreneurial alertness to new 
opportunities;  in turn, the venture team was ready and able to pursue new 
challenges. As a result, the entrepreneur's knowledge breadth and the specialised 
knowledge and resources of the team were integrated (Alvarez & Barney, 2002, 
p. 89–105; Kirzner, 1973), leading to the development of the business 
opportunity. The past development of two successful products created an internal 
core capability within the firm, which supported the development and 
commercialisation of other new products. The successful development of 
products, in turn, contributed to the development and growth of the firm.  
 
Augmenting a structuration perspective of entrepreneurship with a resource-
based view of entrepreneurial actions and firm development reveals close 
linkages between the processes of entrepreneurship, product commercialisation 
and company development and a firm's business contexts.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
List of Interview Questions 
 
1. What circumstances directly preceded the venture's beginnings? Who initiated the 
venture? Does the current leadership include those persons?  If not, who is currently 
in charge?  
2. What is the ownership, leadership, and management structure of the new venture? 
3. What are the entrepreneurial team members like, in terms of leadership, background 
experience, skills, motivations and aspirations? 
4. How did the new digital autopsy concept originate?  How did the lead entrepreneur 
and his team identify the business opportunities related to this new concept?  
5. How did their taking advantage of the opportunities unfold? Especially, at which 
point of the "opportunity development" did the entrepreneurial team officially decide 
to exploit the opportunity?  
6. What were/are the proposed values of the digital autopsy system? What were the 
competitive strategies employed when entering the market and growing the business?  
7. What problems has the venture faced in regard to its innovation support system/ 
context? (Consider: an underdeveloped location context and an underdeveloped 
venture capital industry) And what strategies, if any, have been employed to 
overcome these problems? 
8. What problems has the venture faced in regard to its industry—in this case, the 
medical/bio informatics applications industry? What strategies have been employed 
to overcome such problems? 
9. What problems has the venture faced, specifically in regard to the Malaysian medical 
medical/bio informatics applications market? (Consider: infrastructural issues, 
culturally-based issues, economic and social issues, etc.) What strategies have been 
utilized in overcoming these problems and achieving success in the marketplace? 
10. What other problems have been encountered so far (as of late 2006)? What 
preparations are being made for problems yet anticipated? 
11. Who have been the venture's supporters? What do you know of their motivations?  
What have been their contributions so far?  
12. What developmental stages and processes have been navigated so far—both in the 
development of the business itself, and in the development of the medical/bio 
informatics innovation that is the core of your business?  
 
[Some of these questions were taken from Khairul Akmaliah, Mohd Fuaad, Hanninen, and Walsh 
(2009) and some were adapted from Carrier, Raymond, and Altaief (2004); Khairul Akmaliah 
(2007); Sanz-Velasco (2006); Shane and Venkataraman (2000); Timmons (1994, pp. 34–37;           
207–233)]. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Process of Digital Autopsy System Innovation and Firm Development 
 
Innovation and Firm Development Process Milestones 
Infovalley Group of Companies: Company Formation and 
Initial Business Development  
 
2001 
• Mathavan left his e-learning venture and started to search 
for other possible business opportunities  
• He took a consulting job to support himself and to finance 
new business exploration  
• He became aware of bioinformatics as an emerging 
industry within the field of biotechnology, but he saw that 
businesses in the industry typically had a long gestation 
time and required huge financial commitment.  
 
 
 
 
 
2002 
• Mathavan formed Infovalley and created a subsidiary called 
Infovalley Business Management to manage consulting 
activities. 
• He put money earned from consulting into bioinformatics 
exploration projects and started recruiting scientists and 
technicians to explore the potential markets for 
bioinformatics solutions.  
 
Formed a new company and created a 
consulting subsidiary 
Infovalley Group of Companies: Growing Bioinformatics 
Business and Infovalley's Digital Autopsy System: 
Opportunity Recognition and  Initial Exploitation  
 
2003 
• Mathavan formed Infovalley Life Sciences (Infovalley LS), 
an MSC Malaysia status company. 
 
 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
Created a subsidiary that is to focus on 
biotech business 
 
• Infovalley LS started developing bioinformatics solution 
for contractual customers.  
• Infovalley LS started integrating vertically into R&D in the 
bioinformatics field. 
 
Started bioinformatics solution product 
development  
Product Line Extension—Vertical 
Integration into Biotechnology R&D 
(Product#2- molecular diagnostic chip 
project) 
 
• Infovalley LS found that the core visualisation technology 
they had created within their bioinformatics domain had a 
potential market within the field of medical informatics. 
---------------------------------- 
MILESTONE 1 
Utility of core visualisation technology is 
proven in medical informatics, specifically 
autopsy  
 
• Mathavan met and talked with Bob Bishop, founder and 
chair of Silicon Graphics International (SGI). This resulted 
in recognition of new possibilities for business ventures in 
the area of autopsy technology. 
---------------------------------- 
MILESTONE 2 
Recognition of digital autopsy system as a 
business opportunity 
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Early 2004 
• Infovalley LS offered a bioinformatics solution for sale for 
the first time. 
---------------------------------- 
Launched Product #1 (a bioinformatics 
solution) 
Infovalley LS: Actual Development of the Digital Autopsy 
System 
• Infovalley LS was organised to dedicate a more focused 
effort to the development of a digital autopsy system. 
• Pramod drew up the system blueprint and established the 
initial requirements for digital autopsy system functionality. 
-------------------------------- 
MILESTONE 3 
Exploitation of the digital autopsy system 
business opportunity 
Mid-2004 
• Programming for the Digital Autopsy System was initiated 
by Malaysian and Indian programmers. 
 
Late 2004 
• Programming for the Digital Autopsy System continued. 
 
 
Infovalley's Digital Autopsy System Commercialisation: 
Gaining the System's Acceptance and Organising a Pilot 
Digital Autopsy Facility 
 
March 2005 
• Infovalley formed iGene, to specifically manage the digital 
autopsy system development project.  
 
Mid-2005 
• Malaysia's Prime Minister and his delegates were 
introduced to a demo version of the Digital Autopsy System 
version 1.0 by Silicon Graphics during the Inaugural 
Biotech IAP meeting in Los Angeles, US. 
---------------------------------- 
MILESTONE 4 
Demonstration of the digital autopsy 
system utility to Malaysian government 
officials 
 
 
 
August 2005 
• US bioinformatics solutions markets were successfully 
penetrated. 
---------------------------------- 
Product #1-Bioinformatics solutions 
business expansion 
October 2005 
• iGene gave another presentation to the Malaysian 
government officials in Cyberjaya.  
December 2005 
• iGene received an endorsement from MOSTI to set up a 
pilot digital autopsy facility in a government hospital. 
• iGene received approval of the system from Malaysia's 
National Fatwa Council and JAKIM. The two organisations 
studied the Digital Autopsy System while considering 
whether to issue a decree declaring that digital autopsy 
would henceforth be the only kind that should be performed 
on Malaysian Muslims, except in situations in which the 
traditional non-digital autopsy is given preference for 
specified reasons. 
---------------------------------- 
MILESTONE 5 
Getting the first sales order for the Digital 
Autopsy System (Product #3) 
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Infovalley Group of Companies: Growing the 
Bioinformatics and Digital Autopsy System Businesses, 
Acquiring More Capital and Expanding into Overseas 
Markets (2006 and beyond) 
 
August 2006 
• Infovalley LS received a government grant to test the 
molecular diagnostic kit. 
---------------------------------- 
Product #2- molecular diagnostic kit was 
market-tested 
 
September 2006 
• The development of the Digital Autopsy System was 
completed. 
• The company suggested to the Malaysian Ministry of 
Health that six digital autopsy facilities be installed in the 
country. 
• The company appointed a corporate financing house to raise 
RM20 million of funds for iGene, the subsidiary that 
manages the digital autopsy project.  
• The company to set up marketing arms for the digital 
autopsy business in multiple countries to penetrate lucrative 
overseas markets. 
 
---------------------------------- 
MILESTONE 6 
Anticipated Digital Autopsy System 
business expansion 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1 The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) was established in 1996. It is an area where development 
of new technology-based ventures is encouraged. The MSC is also a project aimed at ultimately 
making the entire country more conducive for doing business, especially in technology-
based/high-growth sectors. As an initial platform, the MSC has a size of 15 km by 50 km and 
stretches from Kuala Lumpur City Center (KLCC) in the north to Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport (KLIA) in the south. Designed to incorporate the infrastructures and support services 
needed to develop new technology-based ventures, the MSC also offers many benefits for 
already-established technology-based companies. Part of the MSC project involved the launching 
of four major government-led projects to create markets for technology-based companies—            
e-government, multipurpose smart card, smart school, and telehealth. Special cyberlaws, policies 
and practices also have been implemented to support the growth of MSC. 
(http://www.msc.com.my) 
 
2 In the fall of each year, IAP members meet with the Malaysian prime minister to discuss two 
issues: (1) The current level of Malaysia IT development, and (2) recommendations for raising 
this level. Each member has a separate one-on-one meeting with the Prime Minister, in order to 
convey personal recommendations. (http://www.mdec.com.my)  
 
3 Malaysia's National Fatwa Council (Majlis Fatwa Malaysia) is the governing body that 
generates religious decrees applicable to all Muslims in Malaysia. The group is 
comprised of all muftis (the head of the Muslim religion in each of the 13 Malaysian 
states). They meet, discuss, and make decisions regarding current religious concerns, 
and also issue decrees related to those concerns. The Department of Islamic 
Development Malaysia (JAKIM) is a Malaysian government institution that 
coordinates Islamic activities and welfare in the country. JAKIM functions as a central 
Malaysian agency in regard to Islamic matters, with the aim of upholding progressive 
and morally high standards for Muslims in the country.  
